Dean v Security and General Insurance Company Ltd

CourtCourt of Appeal (Bahamas)
JudgeIbrahim, J.A.
Judgment Date21 July 2005
Neutral CitationBS 2005 CA 261
Date21 July 2005
Docket NumberCivil Appeal No. 12 of 2005

Court of Appeal

Sawyer, P.; Ibrahim, J.A.; Osadebay, J.A.

Civil Appeal No. 12 of 2005

Security and General Insurance Company Limited

Gavin Cassar, Esq, counsel for applicant.

Applicant in person.

Roy Sweeting, Esq, counsel for respondent.

Civil practice and procedure - Extension of time for filing appeal — Application struck for want of jurisdiction seven months prior — No explanation for inordinate delay — Motion dismissed.

Ibrahim, J.A.

This action was commenced by way of a writ of summons on the 14th of February, 1997, by which damages were sought for repair of the applicant's motor vehicle and for costs and interest pursuant to the Civil Procedure (Award of Interest) Act, 1993.


Judgment taken up by the applicant in default of appearance, and that was entered on the 8th of September, 1997. The judgment, however, was set aside on the 15th of December, 1997.


A reply to the defence was filed by the applicant on January 7, 1998, and no steps were taken thereafter in the Court for the prosecution of the action.


A summons was taken out by the respondent on August 26, 2003, for the dismissal of the action for want of prosecution under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.


The trial judge made an order in terms of the summons, and in July of 2004, the action was struck out.


It was not until the 25th of February this year, 2005, that the applicant filed proceedings here seeking an extension of time for the purpose of filing the appeal, the time having expired quite some months ago.


Affidavits were filed by the applicant, and there is no nowhere in the affidavits that were filed any explanation as to any reason why it was that the notice of appeal was not filed within the prescribed time.


Now, the issue before the trial judge was one of inordinate delay. The issue before us this morning is also one of inordinate delay. The trial judge dealt with the matter, and we can find no fault with the manner in which the trial judge dealt with the matter, nor with the order which the trial judge made. Before us, we can find no reasonable ground to interfere with the trial judge's order for we do not find that there was any ground that was placed before us, nor any facts in support of any ground, that would cause us to exercise our discretion to grant the extension of time that was sought.

In the circumstances, the motion that was filed on the 25th of...

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