Jamal Taylor v Director of Public Prosecutions

• Jurisdiction: Bahamas
• Judge: Neil Brathwaite
• Judgment Date: 30 October 2024
• Docket Number: 2023/CRI/bail/00054
• Court: Supreme Court (Bahamas)

Between

Jamal Taylor

Applicant

and

Director of Public Prosecutions

Respondent

Before:

The Hon. Justice Neil Brathwaite

2023/CRI/bail/00054

IN THE SUPREME COURT

CRIMINAL LAW DIVISION

Appearances:

Mr. Stanley Rolle for the Applicant

Mr. Basil Cumberbatch, Ms. Kara Butler-Wight for the Respondent

RULING ON BAIL

1 The Applicant seek bail on charges of Attempted Armed Robbery, Possession of an Unlicensed Firearm, and Possession of Ammunition in respect of which he was charged in the Magistrate's Court on 9 ^th March 2023. The Applicant is twenty-seven years old, and worked in construction prior to his remand. He states that he has no other pending matters, but admits having been previously convicted of Possession of an Unlicensed Firearm, Possession of Ammunition, Armed Robbery, Robbery, and Stealing. He suggests that he is not a flight risk. He maintains his innocence, and seek to be released on bail pending his trial.

2 In seeking to oppose the application, the Respondent relied on the affidavit of Vashti Bridgewater filed 25 ^th October 2023. The statements exhibited to that affidavit reveal that within minutes of receiving a report of an attempted armed robbery at Superwash, Carmichael Road, police officers responded and pursued a vehicle fitting the description of the vehicle in which the suspects had left the scene. At the conclusion of that chase, officers arrested the Applicant, who allegedly ran from that vehicle. The vehicle was searched, and a loaded firearm was recovered. The Applicant was interviewed, and admitted that it was the vehicle that was shown in surveillance footage from the establishment, and stated that he was merely giving two other men who were in the vehicle a ride.

3 On behalf of the Applicant, it is submitted that his pre-trial detention was prejudicial, as it resulted in a loss of livelihood. Counsel relied on the constitutional presumption of innocence, and further submitted that the test for the court in considering this application is whether the Applicant is likely to appear for his trial. Furthermore, counsel noted that the Applicant's trial is not scheduled to commence until 30 ^th March 2026, by which time the Applicant would have been in custody for just over three years, which it was suggested is unreasonable. It was further noted that there is no suggestion that the Applicant has breached bail conditions in the past. Counsel therefore suggested that conditions could be put in place to ensure the Applicant's attendance at trial, and urged the court to release the Applicant on bail.

4 On behalf of the Respondent, it was noted that a previous bail application was refused in November 2023, on the basis that the court was satisfied that there was a need to protect public order. Reliance was placed on the nature and seriousness of the offence, as well as the cogency of the evidence and the antecedents of the Applicant to support an inference, that there is a need to protect public order in this case. With respect to the question of detention for an unreasonable length of time, counsel notes that the Bail Act, while defining a reasonable time as three years, states that this definition is without limiting the extent of a reasonable time. It was therefore suggested that a three year period is not a limiting factor, and counsel further noted that the trial date is just two weeks outside of that three year period. It was therefore suggested that the continued detention of the Applicant pending his trial would not be unreasonable, and that there has been no change in circumstances since the refusal of bail by Hilton J.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

5 The tensions surrounding an application for bail have been considered in many cases. In Richard Hepburn and The Attorney General SCCr. App. No 276 of 2014, Justice of Appeal Allen opined that:

“5. Bail is increasingly becoming the most vexing, controversial and complex issue confronting free societies in every part of the world. It highlights the tension between two important but competing interests: the need of the society to be protected from persons alleged to have committed crime; and the fundamental constitutional canons, which secure freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention and serve as the bulwark against punishment before conviction.”

6. Indeed, the recognition of the tension between these competing interests is reflected in the following passage from the Privy Council's decision in Hurnam The State [2006] LRC 370. At page 374 of the judgment Lord Bingham said inter alia:

“…the courts are routinely called upon to consider whether an unconvicted suspect or defendant shall be released on bail, subject to conditions, pending his trial. Such decisions very often raise questions of importance both to the individual suspect or defendant and to the community as whole. The interests of the individual is, of course, to remain at liberty unless or until he is convicted of crime sufficiently serious to deprive him of his liberty”. Any loss of liberty before that time, particularly if he is acquitted or never tried, will prejudice him and, in many cases, his livelihood and his family. But the community has countervailing interests, in seeking to ensure that the course of justice is not thwarted by the flight of the suspect or defendant or perverted by his interference with witnesses or evidence and that he does not take advantage of the inevitable delay before trial to commit further offences…”

6 At paragraph 11 she further noted that

“The general right to bail clearly requires judges on such an application, to conduct realistic assessment of the right of the accused to remain at liberty and the public's interests as indicated by the grounds prescribed in Part A for denying bail. Ineluctably, in some circumstances, the presumption of innocence and the right of an accused to remain at liberty, must give way to accommodate that interest.”

7 The presumption of innocence is enshrined in Article 20(2)(a) of the Constitution of The Bahamas which states:

“ Every person who is charged with a criminal offence - (a) shall be Presumed to be innocent until he is proved or has pleaded guilty”.

8 Furthermore, Article 19(l)provides as follows:

“ 19. (1) No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty save as may be authorised by law in any of the following cases-

(a) in execution of the sentence or order of a court, whether established for The Bahamas or some other country, in respect of a criminal offence of which he has been convicted or in consequence of his unfitness to plead to a criminal charge or in execution of the order of a court on the grounds of his contempt of that court or of another court or tribunal;

(b) in execution of the order of a court made in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation imposed upon him by law;

(c) for the purpose of bringing him before a court in execution of the order of a court;

(d) upon reasonable suspicion of his having committed, or of being about to commit, a criminal offence;

(e) in the case of a person who has not attained the age of eighteen years, for the purpose of his education or welfare;

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